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Abstract
We study ethnic favoritism in a global sample and rely on nighttime light inten-
sity to capture a broad range of preferential policies targeted towards the political
leaders’ ethnic homelands. We construct two panel data sets with several thousand
ethnographic regions from around 140 multi-ethnic countries and annual observa-
tions from 1992 to 2013. We find robust evidence for ethnic favoritism: nighttime
light becomes 7%–10% more intense in the political leaders’ ethnic homelands. We
document that ethnic favoritism is a global phenomenon not restricted to Africa,
poor countries, or autocracies. We also provide evidence that ethnic favoritism is
partly motivated by electoral concerns and more prevalent in the presence of ethnic
parties.
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1 Introduction
In his study on ethnic politics in Zambia, Posner (2005, p. 97) observes that “[t]he lesson
that the President will favor his own ethnic group has become, for many Zambians, an
axiom of politics.” Zambia is no exception. There is plenty of anecdotal as well as
rigorous evidence for ethnic favoritism in many African countries. Kenya is a prominent
example. Many citizens and international observers are well aware that both the Kalenjin-
dominated government around Daniel arap Moi, who was president from 1978 to 2002,
and the Kikuyu-dominated government around Mwai Kibaki, who was president from
2002 to 2013, engaged in patronage and ethnic favoritism (Wrong, 2009). Recent studies
have exploited changes in the ethnicity of high-level politicians to quantify the extent
of ethnic favoritism in Kenya. Thereby, Burgess et al. (2015) focus on road building
across districts with different ethnic compositions, and Kramon and Posner (2016) on
educational attainments across individuals from different ethnic groups.
Few studies go beyond the level of individual countries.1 Franck and Rainer (2012)
are an exception. They find evidence for widespread ethnic favoritism in infant mortality
and various educational outcomes in a panel of 18 African countries. Moreover, Kramon
and Posner (2013) document the pattern of ethnic favoritism in six African countries.
They show that this pattern varies dramatically across policy areas and argue that ethnic
favoritism in one policy area may often be compensated with rationing in another area.
They therefore advise against making general claims about ethnic favoritism based on
empirical findings for a single policy area.
We offer a novel approach for studying the prevalence and determinants of ethnic
favoritism. Our approach differs in two important ways from the previous literature.
First, we go beyond Africa and study Posner’s (2005) axiom of politics at the global level
using two large and diverse samples of multi-ethnic countries from all over the world.
Second, we use a broad measure of ethnic favoritism that allows capturing the aggregate
distributive effect of a wide range of policies. In particular, we rely on nighttime light
intensity recorded by US Air Force weather satellites for the years 1992 to 2013. Given
our global coverage and our broad measure, we think of ethnic favoritism in broad terms.
We collect information about the political leaders’ ethnicities and understand by ethnic
favoritism all policies that mainly benefit the political leaders’ own ethnic group. These
policies can be diverse and include, e.g., patronage, targeted public infrastructure projects,
and transfer payments. Like the policies, the motives can be diverse too: some political
leaders may be more altruistic towards their group, while others may support their group
for strategic reasons, e.g., electoral concerns.
The units of observation in our analysis are ethnographic regions. We follow Alesina
1Golden and Min (2013) provide an inventory of more than 150 empirical studies on distributive
politics. They find that most studies focus on a single democratic country and a single policy area.
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et al. (2016) in using two different samples based on the two most prominent ethnographic
maps available. These maps are based on the Ethnologue data and the Geo-Referencing of
Ethnic Groups (GREG) project, which has digitalized the classical Soviet Atlas Narodov.
Our Ethnolouge-based sample includes 7,653 ethnographic regions from 141 multi-ethnic
countries and our GREG-based sample 2,032 ethnographic regions from 137 multi-ethnic
countries. The main variables are nighttime light intensity and a variable that indicates
whether an ethnographic region is the ethnic homeland of the country’s current political
leader.
We find that being the political leaders’ ethnic homelands is positively associated with
nighttime light intensity after including region-fixed effects to control for time-invariant
regional characteristics, and country-year dummy variables to control for country-wide
changes over time. To address the potential endogeneity of the political leaders’ ethnicity,
we also document that the ethnic homelands of the future political leaders do not have
significantly more intense nighttime light in the years prior to an ethnic transition, i.e.,
prior to a leadership transition associated with a change in the political leader’s ethnic-
ity. We thus interpret the positive association between being the political leaders’ ethnic
homelands and nighttime light intensity as evidence for ethnic favoritism. Our baseline
estimates imply that ethnographic regions have 7%–8% more intense nighttime light and
around 2% higher regional GDP if they are the political leaders’ ethnic homelands than
they would have in the counterfactual situation in which the political leaders belonged
to other ethnic groups. Combining the Ethnologue data with linguistic trees, we show
that ethnic favoritism extends to ethnic groups that are linguistically close to the political
leader. Moreover, we find that ethnographic regions even have 10% more intense night-
time light and around 3% higher regional GDP if they are the political leaders’ ethnic
homelands than they would have if the political leaders belonged to linguistically distant
ethnic groups.
Our large and diverse sample allows studying possible determinants and the preva-
lence of ethnic favoritism. We first confirm widespread ethnic favoritism in Africa in
our sample that includes more African countries than previous studies. We then show
that the preconception that ethnic favoritism is mainly or even entirely an African phe-
nomenon is mistaken. Ethnic favoritism seems to be as prevalent outside of Africa as it
is in Africa itself. Hence, Posner’s axiom of politics holds globally. The prevalence of
ethnic favoritism is also not significantly related to the level of economic development or
the quality of political institutions. Given that ethnic favoritism seems to be a general
phenomenon, we then try to understand why political leaders engage in ethnic favoritism.
Exploiting information on elections and term limits, we provide evidence that electoral
concerns matter, but that alternative motives like altruism towards co-ethnics are likely
to be important as well. We further find that ethnic favoritism tends to be more prevalent
in the presence of ethnic parties.
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Our results further reveal that nighttime light intensity is back at its normal level
already two years after an ethnic transition. Hence, ethnic favoritism does not contribute
to sustainable development.
Our paper primarily contributes to the literature on ethnic favoritism, which goes
back to Bates (1974) and includes the studies discussed above. Our main contributions
to this literature are the global sample and the use of nighttime light intensity to capture
a broad range of preferential policies targeted towards the political leaders’ ethnic home-
lands. Thereby we also contribute to a recent debate on the role of political institutions:
Burgess et al. (2015) find that ethnic favoritism in road building in Kenya disappears
if political institutions improve from being autocratic to being anocratic or even demo-
cratic.2 In contrast, Franck and Rainer (2012) and Kramon and Posner (2016) find at best
very limited constraining effects of better political institutions on ethnic favoritism. Our
global sample and broad measure of ethnic favoritism also suggest limited constraining
effects: ethnic favoritism tends to be most prevalent in anocracies, and to exist even in
democracies. We submit that the political leaders’ electoral concerns may explain why
democratization is often not effective in curbing ethnic favoritism.
More generally, our paper contributes to the literature studying the effects of ethnic
divisions on governance and economic development.3 Easterly and Levine (1997) show
that ethnic fractionalization impacts negatively on economic development. Various possi-
ble channels have been discussed. La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) find that
ethnic fractionalization lowers the quality of government, and Alesina and Zhuravskaya
(2011) show that ethnic segregation has a particularly strong negative effect on the quality
of government. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) and Glennerster et al. (2013) study whether
ethnic diversity reduces public goods provision. Hjort (2014) finds evidence that eth-
nic diversity negatively affects workers’ productivity. Francois et al. (2014, 2015) study
how political leaders in ethnically diverse Sub-Saharan African countries increase their
chances of staying in power by sharing the benefits of holding office and by regularly
replacing their ministers. They argue that these policies are one reason for the poor per-
formance of many ethnically diverse Sub-Saharan African countries. Alesina et al. (2016)
find inequality between ethnographic regions to be negatively linked to country-wide eco-
nomic performance. We contribute to this literature by showing that ethnic favoritism
is common in societies with ethnic cleavages, and that ethnic favoritism does not lead
to sustainable development in the targeted regions. These findings suggest that ethnic
favoritism is another reason why ethnic cleavages may hinder economic development.4
Our paper is most closely related to Hodler and Raschky’s (2014a) study on regional
2Anocracies are regimes that have both autocratic and democratic traits. Many scholars refer to
countries with intermediate polity scores as anocracies (see section 3).
3See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for an overview.
4Our paper further relates to the emerging literature on the role of political leaders in economic
development (e.g., Jones and Olken 2005, Kasara 2007, Dreher et al. 2009, and Besley et al. 2011)
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favoritism. They also exploit variation in nighttime light intensity within subnational
regions, but focus on administrative regions at the second subnational level (SN2 regions)
rather than ethnographic regions, and on the political leaders’ birthplaces rather than
their ethnicities. They find strong evidence that political leaders favor the SN2 region in
which they were born.5 However, we show that ethnic favoritism is substantially different
from birthplace favoritism along a number of dimensions:6 First, from a geographical
perspective, birthplace favoritism focuses on a single, rather small geographic area that
is the political leader’s SN2 birth region. In contrast, ethnic favoritism looks at regions
that are on average larger and sometimes contain multiple, physically separated areas
within the same country.7 Our results show that regions that share the same ethnicity
as the political leader but are located in parts of the country other than his birth region
still benefit. Second, and maybe opposite to some common perception, we show that
birthplace favoritism and ethnic favoritism affect different subsets of countries. Hodler
and Raschky (2014a) find that birthplace favoritism is a phenomena that mainly occurs in
countries with weak political institutions. In contrast, we find little constraining effects of
better political institutions on ethnic favoritism. We even show that electoral concerns are
one important motive for ethnic favoritism and that ethnic parties may facilitate ethnic
favoritism. Third, as a consequence, the policy implications of these two papers differ as
well. While improving political institutions may help to curb birthplace favoritism, it may
not help to address ethnic favoritism. More importantly, a key feature of democratization,
free elections, might even exacerbate ethnic favoritism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents anecdotal
evidence on ethnic favoritism outside of Africa, section 3 the data, section 4 the empirical
strategy, section 5 our findings, and section 6 some concluding remarks.
2 Anecdotal evidence
In this section we provide anecdotal evidence for ethnic favoritism in countries from all
over the world. We thereby focus on countries outside Africa, as the prevalence of ethnic
favoritism in Africa is well documented and as we are the first to study ethnic favoritism
in a global sample. The anecdotal evidence from these countries illustrates the various
forms that ethnic favoritism can take outside of Africa.
5Like us, Soumahoro (2015) also builds on Hodler and Raschky (2014a) to study ethnic favoritism.
Unlike us, he exploits only cross-sectional variation and restricts his analysis to Africa. He finds a very
large effect of being the political leader’s ethnic homeland on nighttime light intensity. We show in Table
3 that the coefficient estimates are indeed many times larger in the absence of ethnographic-region fixed
effects that control for time-invariant omitted variables.
6Ahlerup and Isaksson (2015) also find birthplace and ethnic favoritism to be independent phenomena
in their analysis of survey data from Afrobarometer.
7An average country has 54 (Ethnologue) or 15 (GREG) ethnographic regions in our sample, but 305
SN2 regions in Hodler and Raschky’s (2014a) sample.
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Bolivia: All Bolivian presidents had been Spanish descendants until Evo Morales from
the indigenous Aymara ethnic group was elected in December 2006. “Evo cumple” – Evo
delivers – was one of the popular slogans surrounding the policies of the new govern-
ment. Indeed, besides the increased importance given to indigenous culture, language,
and symbols, substantial material benefits reached the indigenous population. Natural
resource revenues, which boomed after the renegotiations with the multinational compa-
nies operating in the country, were used to fund policies targeting the poor indigenous
population in the highlands, particularly focusing on literacy, health, road construction,
and rural electrification. About USD 480 million were disbursed to fund some 3,900 small
infrastructure projects (Farthing and Kohl 2014, Sivak 2008).8 The positive net effects of
these policies has been widely recognized, with substantial increases in literacy rates, a
drastic reduction of the maternal mortality rate, and an overall reduction of poverty rates
in the countryside (Farthing and Kohl 2014).
Land redistribution and titling explicitly targeted the indigenous population: by 2013
about 157 million acres had been affected, with about 321,000 titles granted mostly to
indigenous people and peasants (Farthing and Kohl 2014). The indigenous population was
also directly benefitting from a series of reforms in the political and educational systems.
The new constitution reserved a quota for indigenous representation in the main political
institutions.9
The nature and effects of the new government policies, however, have generated several
critics. Despite the rhetoric describing the new constitution as plurinational to stress the
equal footing on which all ethnic groups stand, the final document gives special relevance
to the Aymara communitarian values (Albro 2010). Similarly, it is argued that key reforms
were guided by Aymara politicians, and that the development model underlying the new
government’s economic policies has been conceptualized by Aymara intellectuals (Farthing
and Kohl 2014).
In the words of Juan del Granado, a human rights lawyer and former mayor of Bolivia’s
capital La Paz: “Unfortunately the attitude in the government – that ‘now it is our turn’
– is contradictory to the construction of a new society, and it smacks of vengeance” (cited
in Farthing and Kohl 2014). Also other indigenous groups are expressing their discontent,
especially among lowland communities, complaining that their interests have been largely
8The number of municipalities without a health post, mainly concentrated in the rural and indigenous
areas, was more than halved, and the number of health centers and hospitals doubled. Moreover, three
cash transfer programs were implemented: a standard conditional cash transfer funding children who stay
in school (“Bono Juancito Pinto”), a pension scheme to lift old people out of poverty (“Renta Dignidad”),
and a cash transfer for women attending pre- and postnatal care (“Juana Azurduy”). In 2009, the total
disbursement in these three cash transfers amounted to close to USD 286 million, about 1.3% of GDP
(Laserna 2011).
9For example, Felix Patzi, an Aymara sociologist, was named education minister with a clear mandate
to increase the presence of indigenous culture in education. This led to the creation of indigenous
universities, supported by the government and local communities, with the explicit goal of promoting
higher education among the indigenous population.
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ignored.10
Hence, Evo Morales’ government may have fostered the emergence of new indigenous
economic elites associated with the government, but, arguably, it did not change the rules
of the political game, plagued by corruption, patronage, and inefficiency. Quoting the
disenchanted words of Javier Medina, a Bolivian philosopher: “The face of government
may have become more indigenous, mostly Aymara. However, the behaviour and way of
managing the state remain the same” (cited in Farthing and Kohl 2014).
Pakistan: Pakistan is a state consisting of ethnic groups that had never been united
before the arrival of the British. In fact, the Baluch, Sindhis, and Pashtuns, who had
resisted Punjabi incursions into their ancestral homelands for centuries, have found them-
selves trapped in a political structure dominated by a Punjabi majority and, to a lesser
extent, the Urdu-speaking Muslim immigrants from India. These two groups control the
armed forces and key political institutions (Harrison 2009).
As a result, ethnic tensions have been simmering throughout Pakistan’s history. Many
of the tensions are related to Punjabi economic exploitations. One example is the un-
favorable deals minorities get for their natural resources: “Although gas obtained from
Baluchistan accounts for 30 percent of Pakistan’s total gas production, Baluchistan con-
sumes only 17 percent of its own output, while the remaining 83 percent goes to the rest of
the country, primarily to the Punjab. The central government charges a much lower price
for Baluchistan gas than for gas produced in other provinces and pays lower royalties”
(Harrison 2009). Another example is the distribution of the Indus River waters between
upstream Punjab and downstream Sind: “All of the 19 barrages, 43 canal systems, three
major storage dams and 12 link canals that have been built in the upper reaches of the
Indus since Partition have either been located in the Punjab or have been designed to
benefit agricultural production there. Sind’s share of the Indus waters has been drasti-
cally reduced since Partition, causing widespread economic devastation. In contrast to
an annual flow of over 94 million acre feet of water into the Arabian Sea before Partition,
the Indus today often runs dry before it reaches the ocean, and 12 million Sindhi farmers
and fishermen have lost their livelihoods” (Harrison 2009).
Many ethnic transitions took place in Pakistan in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Benazir
Bhutto, a Sindhi politician, became prime minister in 1988. She abandoned the model
of state-led development. The deregulations and privatizations went hand-in-hand with
corruption and nepotism, which finally led to her dismissal by the president in 1990 (Burki
1999). The Punjabi politician Mian Nawaz Sharif was elected prime minster in the same
year. The main differences in his approach was the provision of public employment for
the educated unemployed in urban areas and the building of expensive infrastructure.
10A Guarani leader said that “[t]hey want to control everything, to do everything according to their
culture, the Andean culture. Very little of what we hoped for as indigenous people is being advanced,
only the things that Evo wants. No, Evo and his ministers have abandoned us” (cited in Postero 2010).
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The main project was a highway from the Islamabad Capital Territory, which borders
the province of Punjab, to this province’s capital Lahore. This highway only benefitted
fellow Punjabis. In 1993, Mian Nawaz Sharif was succeeded by Benazir Bhutto. She was
once again followed by Nawaz Sharif before Urdu-speaking Pervez Musharraf took power
in a coup d’etat in 1999.
Ukraine: Ethnolinguistic divides have played an important role in the Ukraine ever
since its independence in 1991. Rjabtschuk (1992) coined the expression of “two Ukraines.”
The first Ukraine is found in the West, where the large majority are native Ukrainian
speakers. There, people have a strong national identity, and many are oriented towards
Western Europe. The second Ukraine is in the East, where many people are native Russian
speakers and are oriented towards Russia. The Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 states that
“[t]he state language in Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.” It continues that “[t]he State
ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all
spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.” A particularly strong
supporter of the idea that the Ukrainian language is important for strengthening national
identity was the Ukrainian speaking Viktor Yushchenko, who was president from 2005 to
2010. He was running campaigns with slogans such as “one nation – one language – one
church” or “think in Ukrainian” (Olszanski 2012). He was followed by Russian speaking
Viktor Yanukovych from Donetsk in the country’s East (and of Belorussian descent), who
wanted Russian to become the second state language.
In the Ukraine, these ethnolinguistic cleavages are paired with the strong role of the
oligarchy. In the early 1990s, an oligarchy established itself thanks to rent-seeking meth-
ods during the country’s slow transition from communism, and from the mid-1990s on-
wards politicians and oligarchs formed close ties (Aslund 2015, Leitner et al. 2015). Viktor
Yanukovych initially appointed several oligarchs from the country’s Russian-speaking East
to powerful ministries. Over time, he started concentrating power in the hands of family
members and Akhmetov, an influential oligarch from Donetsk. They enriched them-
selves “through energy subsidies, discretionary public procurement, embezzlement from
the state, privileged privatization, fraudulent refunds of value-added tax to exporters,
extortion, and corporate raiding” (Aslund 2015).
3 Data
Our units of observation are subnational ethnographic regions, and we construct two
panel data sets with annual observations from 1992 to 2013. These two data sets are
based on two different ethnographic maps. The first one is from the World Language
Mapping System and maps the traditional homelands of the language groups described
in the Ethnologue (Gordon, 2005), which provides a comprehensive list of the world’s
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known living languages. The second map is from the GREG project by Weidmann et al.
(2010), who have digitalized the classical Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira and therefore record
the ethnic distribution of the world population in the 1960s.
These two maps and the underlying data sets differ in various respects. Among others,
Ethnologue is more disaggregated than GREG. Ethnologue features many more ethno-
graphic regions in Africa, the Americas, and Oceania, and somewhat more in Asia. The
exception is Europe, where the number of ethnographic regions per country is roughly
similar. We use both these ethnographic maps, because they both have their advantages
and disadvantages, and because any pattern that prevails in both data sets is unlikely to
result from some peculiar coding or mapping of some ethnic groups.11
Ethnographic regions are areas of a country that share the same ethnic composition.
We drop the few ethnographic regions with a size of less than ten square kilometers or
zero population (according to the population density map introduced below). In both
data sets, the resulting share of ethnically homogenous ethnographic regions, i.e., regions
inhabited by only one ethnic group, is between 75% and 80%, and the large majority of the
remaining ethnographic regions are inhabited by two ethnic groups.12 Excluding countries
with only one ethnographic region, and the (mostly small) countries for which we have
no information about their political leaders, we end up with a sample of 141 multi-ethnic
countries in the Ethnologue data and 137 multi-ethnic countries in the GREG data. There
are 131 multi-ethnic countries from all over the world that feature in both data sets.13
There are 7,653 ethnographic regions (i.e., on average 54 per country) in the Ethnologue
sample and 2,032 ethnographic regions (i.e., on average 15 per country) in the GREG
sample.14
The identity of political leaders is obtained from the Archigos database, version 4.0,
by Goemans et al. (2009). This database provides information on the top political leaders
of many countries around the world for many years up to 2014. It includes the exact
starting and ending dates of the political leaders’ time in power. We add to this database
the ethnic affiliation of all political leaders who were in power for at least 30 days in the
11Alesina et al. (2016) also use these two ethnographic maps. They provide a complementary discussion
of these two maps and the underlying data.
12The largest number of ethnic groups in an ethnographic region is 7 in Ethnologue and 3 in GREG.
13The most common reason that countries appear in only one data set is that they feature only one
ethnographic region according to the other data set. For example, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uruguay are
homogenous according to Ethnologue but not according to GREG; while Denmark, Ireland, Madagascar,
and Portugal are homogenous according to GREG but not according to Ethnologue. Countries that are
homogenous and, therefore, excluded in both data sets include Cuba, Haiti, Iceland, Saudi Arabia, and
the two Koreas. Further, we exclude Serbia due to the non-trivial changes of its boundaries during our
sample period. In addition, some countries are excluded because the ethnicity of their political leaders is
absent in the respective data set (see below).
14The distribution of the number of ethnographic regions is heavily skewed. The outliers in Ethnologue
are Papua New Guinea with 725 ethnographic regions, Indonesia with 660, India with 606, and Nigeria
with 481. The outliers in GREG are Russia with 136 ethnographic regions, Indonesia with 118, and India
with 101.
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years from 1988 to 2014. We match the ethnicity of these political leaders to the ethnic
categories in the GREG and the Ethnologue data, respectively, using Murdock (1959),
Fearon (2003), and various web-based sources, including Ethnologue. This matching
allows us to construct a variable which indicates whether an ethnographic region is the
ethnic homeland of the country’s current political leader. This variable, Leaderict, is equal
to 1/nic if the political leader is from one of the nic ethnic groups living in ethnographic
region i of country c and in power throughout year t. In particular, Leaderict = 1 for
single-ethnic regions populated by the political leader’s ethnic group. We set Leaderict
to missing if the country’s political leader has a foreign ethnicity; if we could not find
any information about his ethnicity; if we could not match his ethnicity to any ethnic
category in the Ethnologue or GREG data, respectively; or if his ethnicity is unmapped
in Ethnologue.15 We exclude countries with many missing observations.16
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides annualized
data on nighttime light intensity for the years from 1992 to 2013. These data are based on
recordings by US Air Force Weather Satellites in evening hours during the dark half of the
lunar cycle in seasons when the sun sets early. NOAA removes observations affected by
cloud coverage or northern or southern lights, and processes the data by setting readings
that are likely to reflect fires, other ephemeral lights or background noise to zero. The
objective is that the reported nighttime light is primarily man-made. NOAA provides the
annual data on a scale from 0 to 63 for output pixels that correspond to less than one
square kilometer. We calculate the average nighttime light intensity of each ethnographic
region for all years from 1992 to 2013 using geographical information system (GIS) soft-
ware. Our dependent variable Lightict is the logarithm of the average nighttime light
intensity in ethnographic region i in country c in year t.17
Henderson et al. (2012) advocate the use of nighttime light intensity as a measure of
economic activity or economic development.18 They document a relatively strong asso-
15There are nine political leaders whose ethnicity is missing in both data sets: five leaders with foreign
ethnicities (e.g., Alberto Fujimori who is of Japanese origin and was president of Peru) and four leaders
for whom we could not find any ethnicity information. In addition, there are some political leaders whose
ethnicity we could only match in one of the two data sets, typically Ethnologue, which has on average
more ethnic groups per country. For example, Americo-Liberians are listed in Ethnologue (as “Liberian
English”), but not in GREG.
16Brunei, Djibouti, and Jordan have no political leader with a domestic ethnicity according to GREG
and are therefore excluded from this data set. Thailand has many unmapped political leaders according
to Ethnologue and is therefore excluded from this data set. We also exclude Moldova, where changes in
the coding of the most important political office by Archigos leads to ethnic transitions in the absence of
any real changes.
17We log transform the data, because the distribution of nighttime light intensity is right-skewed
(Henderson et al. 2012, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, Hodler and Raschky 2014a). We also
follow Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2014) and Hodler and Raschky (2014a,b) in adding 0.01
to the nighttime light intensity before taking the logarithm. This operation allows us to preserve all the
observations without any reported nighttime light, e.g., observations from regions in which the man-made
nighttime light remains below the detection limit of the satellites’ sensors.
18Earlier studies using nighttime light intensity as a proxy for economic activity include Sutton and
Constanza (2002), Doll et al. (2006), and Sutton et al. (2007).
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ciation between changes in nighttime light intensity and changes in GDP at the country
level, and Hodler and Raschky (2014a) provide evidence for a similarly strong association
at the level of subnational administrative regions. Given its availability at the local level
and its positive association with GDP, nighttime light intensity has become a widely used
measure of economic activity or economic development in studies looking at subnational
administrative regions (e.g., Hodler and Raschky 2014a,b) as well as ethnographic regions
(e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, 2014, and Alesina et al. 2016).
For our purpose, nighttime light intensity has two further advantages. First, it is
measured in the same high quality all over the world and cannot be politically manipulated
by opportunistic political leaders. Second, it is less prone to the concern raised by Kramon
and Posner (2013), who advise against making general claims about ethnic favoritism
based on output measures capturing only a single policy area. While being far from
perfect, changes in nighttime light intensity are likely to capture policy changes in a wide
range of policy areas. Roads, medical centers, and other public infrastructure projects
may well increase the intensity of nighttime light. In addition, higher transfer payments
or lower taxes may lead to more private consumption and higher investments, which may
both translate into more intense nighttime light.
As an alternative dependent variable, we use the logarithm of nighttime light per
capita, Lightpcict. We use the population density maps by Gridded Population of the
World, version 3. These maps are available for every fifth year, and we interpolate them
for the missing years. We then define Populationict as the logarithm of the population in
region i of country c in year t, and Lightpcict ≡ Lightict − Populationict.
We now turn to variables representing potential determinants of ethnic favoritism. We
measure country-wide economic development using the logarithm of real GDP per capita,
labelled GDPct. This is based on expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs from Penn
World Tables, version 8.1. We measure the quality of political institutions by the polity
score from the Polity IV project, which is an aggregate measure based on the constraints
on the executive, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the
competitiveness and regulation of political participation. The polity score ranges from
-10 to 10, with the former indicating highly autocratic countries and the latter indicating
strong democracies. We use a normalized version of the polity score, Polityct, which
ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more democratic institutions, as well as
a set of dummy variables for different types of political institutions. Following common
practice, we set Autocracyct = 1 for polity scores below -5, Anocracyct = 1 for polity
scores between -5 and 5, and Democracyct = 1 for policy scores above 5.
For information on elections we rely on the National Elections Across Democracy and
Autocracy (NELDA) database, version 4, by Hyde and Marinov (2012). In particular, we
use it to code the years of elections in which the office of the political leader was contested.
The dummy variables Electionct is equal to one for country-years in which a leadership
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election took place, and zero otherwise.
We mainly rely on the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions for information
on term limits. We use this database to construct the dummy variable TermLimitedct,
which is equal to one if formal restraints, typically binding term limits, prevent the po-
litical leader from serving an additional term after the current one, and zero otherwise.19
We use three measures to study the role of ethnic parties. The first is the aggregate
vote share of ethnic parties, labeled EthnicSharec. We have compiled this vote share
in two steps: First, we have assembled a list of ethnic parties consisting of the union of
the lists in Ishiyama (2009), Lublin and Wright (2013) and Vogt (2013). Second, we have
calculated the aggregate vote share of the parties on this list in the first national legislative
elections after 1991, using various web-based sources. The second measure is the party
voting fractionalization index by Huber (2012), labeled EthnicPV Fc and available for 43
countries. Countries with high index values are characterized by the presence of many
parties with an ethnically relatively homogeneous voter pool.20 The third measure is
based on Afrobarometer, round 6, and available for 33 African countries. It captures the
share of respondents in a country answering “the ethnicity of party leaders or members”
when asked about the “most important difference between the ruling party and opposition
parties.” We call this share EthnicPerceptionc, as it directly measures whether the main
parties are perceived as ethnic parties by the people.
Panels A and B in Table 1 provide summary statistics for the main variables in the
Ethnologue and the GREG data sets, respectively.
Table 1 about here
Our empirical analysis will primarily exploit ethnic transitions, i.e., transitions in the
country’s political leadership that are associated with a change in the political leader’s
ethnicity. Table 2 therefore provides information on leadership and ethnic transitions
during our sample period as well as some cross-sectional information on the countries
that experienced ethnic transitions.
Table 2 about here
An average country in our data has around four leadership transitions and around one
ethnic transition in the years from 1992 to 2013. There are 52 countries with ethnic
transitions in our Ethnologue data and 45 in our GREG data. The median number of
ethnic transitions in these countries is two, and the mean is around three in both data
sets. There are 40 countries that have ethnic transitions according to both data sets.
Of these, the country with most ethnic transitions is Switzerland with 12, followed by
19In the Online Appendix, we further make use of the NELDA database to identify country-years with
leadership elections in which the incumbent political leader could not run due to binding term limits.
20Huber (2012) also provides a party voting polarization index. The two indices lead to similar results
in both the Ethnologue and the GREG data.
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Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, and Sierra Leone with 5
to 7 ethnic transitions each.21 There are 12 countries that have ethnic transitions only in
the Ethnologue data, mostly because ethnic groups are more disaggregated in Ethnologue,
and five countries that have ethnic transitions only in the GREG data, because Ethnologue
does not map some ethnic groups, e.g., Hindi-speakers in Fiji and Trinidad and Tobago.
Table 2 shows that slightly more than half of the countries with ethnic transitions
are in Africa. However, there are ethnic transitions in all other continents as well. We
further see that countries with ethnic transitions tend to be poorer than countries with-
out ethnic transitions, but that their political institutions tend to be of similar quality
nevertheless. As one would expect among the countries with ethnic transitions, those in
Africa tend to be poorer and to have worse political institutions than those elsewhere.
Also, countries with ethnic transitions, especially those outside of Africa, have on average
more ethnographic regions.22
4 Empirical strategy
Our main objective is to explore whether political leaders favor their ethnic homelands
when being in power. We therefore estimate the following equation:
Lightict = αic + βct + γLeaderict + ict (1)
The ethnographic region-fixed effects αic control for all time-invariant regional characteris-
tics, e.g., climatic, geographic, and historical factors. The country-year dummy variables
βct control for shocks common to all regions of a given country, as well as for changes
in the weather satellites and the deterioration of their sensors over time. Given that we
identify ethnic favoritism using changes in the political leaders’ ethnicities, and that these
changes are likely associated with changes in country-wide policies, the standard errors
ict should be clustered at least at the ethnic leadership spell-country level. We choose
to be conservative and cluster the standard errors ict at the country level, so that the
estimates are robust to possible serial correlation in the data.
The coefficient of interest, γ, measures the effect of Leaderict on Lightict. A positive
coefficient implies that ethnographic regions have more intense nighttime light if a member
of their ethnic group(s) is the country’s political leader throughout the year than in the
21In Switzerland, a power sharing arrangement ensures that all major political parties and all major
ethnic groups are represented in the executive council, and that the individual council members rotate as
chairs of the executive council. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has 20 ethnic transitions according to the
GREG data, but none according to the Ethnologue data (where two of the three major ethnic groups are
unmapped), has had a similar arrangement since 1998. Our results are not driven by these two countries.
If anything, our results become stronger when we exclude these countries, in which the political leaders
have little more power than the other members of the executive council.
22This difference is mainly due to the high number of regions in India and Indonesia (in both data sets)
and in Nigeria and Papua New Guinea (in Ethnologue), which all experienced ethnic transitions.
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counterfactual situation in which the political leader belonged to some other ethnic group.
We thus interpret a positive and significant coefficient γ as evidence for ethnic favoritism.
Equation (1) implies that coefficient γ is identified by the countries experiencing ethnic
transitions during our sample period. We exclude all country-years with ethnic transitions
in our main specification, because it is unclear whether or not the ethnic homelands of
political leaders who enter or exist power should be seen as “treated” in these years.23
Our interpretation of a positive and significant coefficient γ as evidence for ethnic
favoritism would be questionable if our estimates of γ were biased due to the potential
endogeneity of the political leader’s ethnicity. Suppose, for instance, that ethnic groups
which are becoming more economically active were also becoming more likely to provide
the country’s next political leader. In this case, a positive association between Leaderict
and Lightict may not necessarily indicate ethnic favoritism. To address this concern, we
document that ethnographic regions that are not yet the ethnic homelands of a political
leader, but will shortly become the ethnic homelands of a new political leader, are not
having more intense nighttime light in these years than in other years in which they are
not part of the current political leaders’ ethnic homelands. Hence, endogeneity does not
seem to be a major concern.
Our objectives go beyond establishing the existence of ethnic favoritism. We are also
interested in studying the scope of ethnic favoritism and in understanding its determinants
and possible motives of the political leaders. We therefore add to our baseline specifica-
tion interaction terms between Leaderict and various country-level variables, e.g., GDP
per capita or polity scores. As our baseline specification already contains country-year
dummy variables, there is no need to include these country-level variables individually
when adding these interaction terms.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Baseline results
Table 3 reports our main results. Panel A shows the results based on the Ethnologue data
and panel B those based on the GREG data.
Table 3 about here
We start in column (1) with a specification that includes the country-year dummy variables
but not yet the region-fixed effects. The positive and statistically significant coefficient
on Leaderict suggests that there is more economic activity and higher levels of economic
development in the political leader’s ethnic homelands than in other ethnographic regions
23We show that our results are robust to separately controlling for these ethnic homelands.
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of the same country in the same year. This finding is consistent with the presence of
ethnic favoritism but vulnerable to any time-invariant omitted-variable bias.
We keep the same specification in column (2) but restrict our sample to the countries
that experienced ethnic transitions during our sample period. The reason is that all sub-
sequent specifications include region-fixed effects and, therefore, only exploit variation in
these countries. The coefficient estimate remains similar in the GREG data but becomes
somewhat smaller in the Ethnologue data. Hence, all subsequent estimates exploit vari-
ation in a sub-sample of countries in which the difference between economic activities in
the political leaders’ ethnic homelands and elsewhere is relatively modest. If anything,
these subsequent estimates are thus rather conservative.
We report the estimates of our main specification, i.e., equation (1), in column (3). The
estimated coefficient of interest is 0.068 in the Ethnologue data, 0.074 in the GREG data,
and statistically significant in both cases. Hence, ethnographic regions have more intense
nighttime light when a member of their ethnic group is the country’s political leader than
they would have in the counterfactual situation in which the political leader belonged to
another ethnic group. We interpret this finding as evidence for ethnic favoritism. We
conjecture that ethnic favoritism tends to be less pronounced in the Ethnologue data, in
which ethnic groups tend to be more disaggregated, because ethnic favoritism extends to
closely related ethnic groups (as shown below).
The remaining columns of Table 3 present various robustness exercises. In column
(4) we drop all ethnographic regions with more than one ethnic group and keep only
the homogenous ethnographic regions. The coefficient estimates remain similar in the
Ethnologue data but become somewhat smaller and less precisely estimated in the GREG
data. The reason for the latter is that, in the GREG data, heterogenous ethnographic
regions are six to seven times more likely than homogenous regions to host the political
leader’s ethnic group. In column (5) and (6) we replace the contemporaneous values
of Leaderict with their first and second lags to allow for a delayed impact of ethnicity-
based policies, e.g., infrastructure projects, on nighttime light intensity. The coefficient
estimates become somewhat higher and remain statistically significant. In column (7) we
replace Lightict with Lightpcict to address the possibility that changes in the distribution
of nighttime light within countries might be driven by changes in the relative population
density. The coefficients of interest remain again similar in magnitude and statistically
significant. Finally, in column (8) we drop the region-fixed effects but add the lagged
dependent variable, Lightict−1.24 The coefficients of interest drop somewhat but remain
statistically significant.
24Our estimates would suffer from the so-called Nickell (1981) bias if we added the lagged dependent
variable and kept the region-fixed effects. Angrist and Pischke (2009) therefore propose estimating a
specification with fixed effects (but no lagged dependent variable) and one with the lagged dependent
variable (but no fixed effects), and document a useful bracketing property of these estimates in case of
doubts about the appropriate specification.
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These additional estimates and our reliance on two different data sets confirm that
ethnographic regions have systematically and robustly more intense nighttime light when
being the political leaders’ ethnic homelands. It is also remarkable that the coefficient
estimates are all in a relatively tight range around the baseline estimates reported in
column (3).25 Equation (1) suggests that being the political leaders’ ethnic homelands
increases nighttime light intensity by 100(exp(γ) − 1)%. Hence, our baseline estimates
of 0.068 and 0.074 suggest an increase in nighttime light intensity by 7.0% or 7.7%,
respectively. Henderson et al. (2012) report a linear relationship between nighttime light
intensity and GDP at the country level and an estimated elasticity of “roughly 0.3.”
Looking at this relationship at the level of subnational administrative regions, Hodler and
Raschky (2014a) also find an elasticity of around 0.3. Assuming that the elasticity is also
around 0.3 at the level of subnational ethnographic regions implies that the increase in
nighttime light intensity by 7.0%–7.7% corresponds to an increase in GDP by 2.1%–2.3%,
which is a fairly sizeable effect.
5.2 Dynamics around ethnic transitions
We next look at the dynamics of nighttime light intensity around ethnic transitions. Doing
so is both important and interesting: it is important to address potential endogeneity
concerns, and it is interesting to understand whether new political leaders manage to
favor their ethnic homelands already right after an ethnic transition, and whether ethnic
favoritism can contribute to sustainable development.
We first construct variables indicating ethnographic regions that are the ethnic home-
lands of political leaders who enter or exit the highest office: we define Entryict = 1/nic
if there is an ethnic transition in country c in year t and the entering political leader be-
longs to one of the nic ethnic groups living in ethnographic region i, and zero otherwise.
Similarly, Exitict = 1/nic if there is an ethnic transition in country c in year t and the
exiting political leader belongs to an ethnic group living in ethnographic region i, and
zero otherwise. In columns (1) and (4) of Table 4 we include ethnic transition years and
add these two new variables.
Table 4 about here
The estimates in column (1), which are based on the Ethnologue data, suggest that ethno-
graphic regions which are the political leaders’ ethnic homelands during parts of the year
have more intense nighttime light than if they were not part of the ethnic homelands of
25As a further robustness test, we use GeoEPR, an ethnographic map by Vogt et al. (2015), which
provides information on the power status of the politically relevant ethnic groups. We again find a
quantitatively similar effect. In addition, we find that this effect is robust to excluding discriminated
groups, and that ethnic favoritism expands to junior partners in government, which is consistent with
the finding that ethnic favoritism extends to linguistically close groups (see below).
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any political leader, but less intense nighttime light than if they were the ethnic home-
lands of a political leader who stayed in power the entire year. The estimates in column
(4), which are based on the GREG data, show the same pattern for ethnographic regions
that are the entering political leaders’ ethnic homelands, but suggest that nighttime light
is still as intense in the exiting political leaders’ ethnic homelands as it would have been
if this political leader had stayed in power the entire year. Reassuringly, the coefficient
estimates on Leaderict are again similar as in our main specification.
In the remaining columns, we further add variables that capture ethnographic regions
populated by the future political leaders’ ethnic group before an ethnic transition or the
past political leaders’ ethnic group after an ethnic transition. We define PreEntry1ict =
1/nic (PreEntry2ict = 1/nic) for ethnographic regions that are not the current political
leaders’ ethnic homelands but the ethnic homelands of the political leaders entering in
year t+1 (t+2), and zero otherwise; and PostExit1ict = 1/nic (PostExit2ict = 1/nic) for
ethnographic regions that are not the current political leaders’ ethnic homelands but the
ethnic homelands of the political leaders who exited in year t−1 (t−2), and zero otherwise.
The coefficient estimates on PreEntry1ict and PreEntry2ict show that nighttime light
does not become more intense in the two years before ethnographic regions become the
political leaders’ ethnic homelands. This result seems inconsistent with the idea that a rise
in economic activity simultaneously increases nighttime light intensity and the chances
that an ethnic group gets into power.
The estimates presented in Table 4 are based on ethnic leadership spells of different
length, leading to compositional differences between the ethnographic regions that become
the political leaders’ ethnic homelands in two years, one year, or the current year. We
therefore complement Table 4 by focusing on a clearly defined set of ethnic transitions
without any compositional changes. In particular, we identify all ethnic transitions in
which the new political leader’s ethnic group was out of power in the five years prior to
the transition year and stayed in power in the five subsequent years. There are only few
countries with such ethnic transitions, and we consider only ethnic transitions between
1997 and 2008 (as we need information on nighttime light intensity in the five years before
and after). We end up with 22 such ethnic transitions in the Ethnologue data and 17
in the GREG data. Figure 1 depicts the development of these political leaders’ ethnic
homelands throughout these 11-year time windows (with the variable capturing the very
first year being omitted). Given the few clusters, the standard errors become unreliable,
and we should look primarily at the coefficient estimates. We again see no evidence that
the entering political leaders’ ethnic homelands do better before the new political leaders
get into power. Quite to the contrary: it even takes a few years after an ethnic transition
before nighttime light intensity starts increasing.
We now switch our focus to the ethnic homelands of the previous political leaders after
an ethnic transition. The coefficient estimates suggest that nighttime light might still be
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somewhat more intense in the previous political leaders’ ethnic homelands in the first year
after an ethnic transition but no longer in the second year. This finding strongly suggests
that ethnic favoritism does not foster sustainable development. A possible reason could
be that most public funds flowing to the political leaders’ ethnic homelands are used for
consumption purposes rather than investments in infrastructure. Padro´ i Miquel (2007)
presents a theoretical model predicting that the political leader would deliberately refrain
from investments in infrastructure, because his co-ethnics are more likely to support him
when their benefits depend on his continued presence in power. Another possible reason
could be that investments into the political leaders’ ethnic homelands do not receive
sufficient follow-up funding from successors belonging to rivalling ethnic groups.
5.3 Ethnic and birthplace favoritism
Hodler and Raschky (2014a) find that political leaders favor their birthplaces. Hence,
one might be worried that our results could pick up the effect of rather localized birth-
place favoritism rather than broader geography-based ethnic favoritism, especially if all
political leaders were born in their ethnic homelands. In order to address this concern
we combine our data with information on the political leaders’ birthplaces.26 These data
show that 22% (in the GREG data) to 26% (in the Ethnologue data) of all domestic-born
political leaders were born outside their ethnic homelands. We thus use the birthplace
information to determine the ethnographic region in which the political leaders were born.
The variable LeaderBirthict is equal to one if the country’s current political leader was
born in ethnographic region i, and zero otherwise.
In Table 5, columns (1) and (5), we first re-estimate our main specification after
dropping all country-years in which the political leader is foreign-born or his birthplace
information missing.
Table 5 about here
The coefficient estimates are similar but somewhat larger than in the full sample. In
columns (2) and (6) we replace Leaderict, which is based on the political leaders’ ethnic-
ities, by LeaderBirthict, which is based on their birthplaces. We find that the coefficient
estimates drop and remain at best statistically significant at the 10% level. In columns
(3) and (7) we include both variables and find that the coefficient estimates on Leaderict
remain large and statistically significant, while those on LeaderBirthict are considerably
smaller and not statistically significant. Hence, ethnic favoritism is more than just a form
of birthplace favoritism.27
26The birthplace information is an updated version of the data set compiled by Hodler and Raschky
(2014a).
27These results do not imply that ethnic favoritism is stronger than birthplace favoritism, as birthplace
favoritism is unlikely to benefit entire ethnographic regions. Indeed, Hodler and Raschky (2014a) focus
on relatively small SN2 regions.
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We present complementary evidence in columns (4) and (8). We construct an alterna-
tive boundary map for the ethnographic regions. We cut out the SN2 regions in which the
political leaders in our sample were born from the respective ethnographic regions. We
then recalculate Lightict for these residual ethnographic regions and estimate our main
specification using this modified dependent variable. The coefficient estimate of interest
increases in magnitude in both data sets. It also remains statistically significant in the
GREG data, but not in the Ethnologue data.28
These estimates strongly suggest that the ethnic favoritism we uncover is not driven
by political leaders favoring their birth regions, and, hence, that ethnic and birthplace
favoritism are two distinct phenomena. The difference between these two phenomena is
confirmed in the next sections, where we show that ethnic favoritism is present even in
democracies and partly motivated by electoral concerns, which contrasts with Hodler and
Raschky’s (2014a) finding that birthplace favoritism disappears in democracies.
5.4 Ethnic favoritism across the world
So far the literature on ethnic favoritism has focused on African countries, and there has
been a preconception that ethnic favoritism is indeed primarily an African phenomenon.
Also, ethnic favoritism has been mainly seen as a problem of relatively poor and weakly
institutionalized countries. We have a sample with more African countries than previous
studies on ethnic favoritism as well as many countries from all other regions of the world.
This large and diverse sample allows testing these preconceptions.
In Table 6 we add various interaction terms between our main explanatory variable
(Leaderict) and potential determinants of ethnic favoritism. These potential determi-
nants include a dummy variable that is equal to one for African countries (Africac), our
measures of country-wide economic development (GDPct), and the quality of political
institutions (Polityct).
Table 6 about here
The coefficient estimates in columns (1) and (6) show that ethnic favoritism is similarly
prevalent within and outside of Africa. Hence, the preconception that ethnic favoritism is
only an African phenomenon is mistaken. Ethnic favoritism rather seems to be a global
axiom of politics. The coefficient estimates in columns (2)–(4) and (7)–(9) suggest that
there is a tendency for ethnic favoritism to become less prevalent in more developed and
more democratic countries, but these tendencies are not statistically significant in any
specification.29
28The likely reason for this difference is that the ethnographic regions are on average much smaller in
the Ethnologue data, such that we cut out entirely a non-trivial share of ethnographic regions that are
ethnic homelands of political leaders.
29We have also looked at the effect of ethnic segregation on the prevalence of ethnic favoritism, using
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The recent literature on ethnic favoritism in Africa has intensively studied the con-
straining effects of improvements in political institutions. Franck and Rainer (2012) and
Kramon and Posner (2016) find very limited effects of political institutions on ethnic
favoritism, while Burgess et al. (2015) find that ethnic favoritism disappears in anocra-
cies and democracies. In columns (5) and (10) we take a closer look at the relationship
between political institutions and ethnic favoritism in our global sample. The estimates
differ somewhat across data sets, but the following results hold in both: First, the coef-
ficient estimates imply that ethnic favoritism tends to be most prevalent in anocracies,
suggesting a potentially non-linear relationship. Second, Wald tests do not allow rejecting
the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the three interaction terms are all the same.30
The pattern emerging from Table 6 is that ethnic favoritism and, therefore, the salience
of ethnic cleavages is a global phenomenon, and that the level of development and the
quality of the political institutions have little impact on its prevalence.31
5.5 Elections, term limits, and the motives for ethnic favoritism
Given that ethnic favoritism is a general phenomenon, the question arises as to why
political leaders tend to favor their co-ethnics. Political leaders could simply be more
altruistic towards co-ethnics than towards members of other ethnic groups. Or they could
engage in ethnic favoritism for strategic reasons, e.g., to improve their chances of staying
in power. In this section, we investigate whether electoral concerns are a key motive for
ethnic favoritism. We do so by looking at elections and term limits.
We first look at whether there is more ethnic favoritism around leadership elections.
There are various ways by which political leaders could target policies towards their ethnic
homelands to improve their reelection chances. First, they could favor their co-ethnics
before the election, hoping that doing so will increase turnout and reduce the support
for opposition candidates in their ethnic homelands. In this case, we might observe an
increase in nighttime light intensity in the election year or even the year before. Second,
political leaders could promise to their co-ethnics that they will reward electoral support
with favorable policies after the election. In this case, we would observe an increase in
the index of ethnic segregation by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). As one may expect, the coefficient
estimate on the interaction term between Leaderict and this index is positive, implying that ethnic
favoritism tends to be more prevalent in more ethnically segregated societies. The coefficient is however
not statistically significant at conventional levels, which may be due to the fact that this index of ethnic
segregation is only available for 86 (84) countries from our Ethnologue (GREG) data.
30We also follow Burgess et al. (2014) in putting democracies and anocracies into one category, which
we call NoAutocracyct. In both data sets, the coefficients on Leaderict×NoAutocracyct are positive and
statistically significantly different from zero (at the 5% level) but not statistically significantly different
from the coefficients on Leaderict ×Autocracyct.
31In the Online Appendix we further document that the extent of ethnic favoritism is by and large
independent of the geography in the political leaders’ ethnic homelands, but tends to decrease in the
historical political centralization of the political leaders’ ethnic groups. The latter result is consistent
with the notion that better historical institutions may map into a less tribal conception of politics.
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nighttime light intensity after the election.
In columns (1) and (5) of Table 7 we add to our main specification interaction terms
between Leaderict and lag, contemporaneous, and lead values of Electionct, which indi-
cates whether there is an election in which the office of the incumbent political leader is
contested.
Table 7 about here
The coefficient estimates on all these interactions terms are positive in both data sets,
but the exact pattern differs somewhat across data sets. The Ethnologue-based estimates
suggest that the political leaders’ ethnic homelands benefit mainly in the election year
and the year thereafter, while the GREG-based estimates suggest that they benefit pri-
marily prior to the election. These results could however be driven by differences between
countries with and without leadership elections, and differences between more and less
experienced political leaders, as most political leaders facing a leadership election have
been in power for at least 3 years. In columns (2) and (6) we therefore add as control vari-
ables interaction terms between Leaderict, on the one hand, and a time-invariant dummy
variable capturing whether there was at least one leadership election during the sample
period, labeled Electionsc, and the political leaders’ years in office up to year t, labeled
Experiencect, on the other hand. The coefficient estimates on the interaction terms of
interest confirm the pattern found in columns (1) and (5).32 These findings suggest that
electoral concerns are indeed an important motive for ethnic favoritism.33
We now turn to comparing political leaders who are in their last term, as they face
binding term limits, with political leaders who do not face binding term limits. This
comparison may be useful to learn about the political leaders’ motives. Finding less
ethnic favoritism for term-limited political leaders would support the notion that electoral
concerns play an important role. Finding more ethnic favoritism for term-limited political
leaders would be consistent with ethnicity-based altruism as a key motive.34 Finally,
there are good reasons to expect no clear relationship between term limits and ethnic
favoritism. Term-limited political leaders may have strong preference for securing a co-
ethnic as future leader to maximize their future expected payoffs in countries featuring
ethnic politics. Moreover, term-limited political leaders may compensate the decrease in
distortions with an increase in corruption, as suggested by Finan and Mazzoco (2016).
32Columns (2) and (6) further show that ethnic favoritism increases with the political leaders’ expe-
rience, but is independent of whether or not there are leadership elections in a country. The reason for
the latter finding is most likely that the set of countries without leadership elections include autocracies
(e.g., Libya) as well as democracies (e.g., Switzerland).
33Focusing on Africa, Eifert et al. (2010) find that the people’s ethnic attachment increases in the
period around executive elections. This increase may well result from the increase in ethnic favoritism in
this period.
34Political leaders with altruistic preferences towards their co-ethnics would want to favor their ethnic
homeland in all terms, but might refrain from doing so when reelections keep them accountable to the
population at large. They would however choose policies according to their own preferences when the
term limit becomes binding (e.g., Besley and Coate, 2003, Besley, 2006).
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In columns (3) and (7) we add to our main specification an interaction term between
Leaderict and the dummy variable Termlimitedct. The coefficient estimates on this in-
teraction term are not statistically significant. In columns (4) and (8) we allow for the
possibility that there are important differences between countries with and without con-
stitutional term limits, or between more and less experienced political leaders. We add
interaction terms between Leaderict, on the one hand, and Experiencect and a time-
invariant dummy variable capturing whether there was at least one term-limited political
leader during our sample period, labeled Termlimitsc, on the other hand. The coefficient
estimates of interest are again not statistically significant, but suggest that term-limited
political leaders tend to engage in more ethnic favoritism than reelectable political leaders
with similar experience in countries with term limits.35
To summarize, there is considerable evidence that elections matter for ethnic fa-
voritism. At the same time, we do not find that political leaders facing term limits
reduce ethnic favoritism. This finding suggests that ethnicity-based altruism may be an
important motive. It is also consistent with the notion that term-limited political lead-
ers care about the electoral prospect of their preferred co-ethnic candidate or that they
compensate distorted policies with higher corruption, with the spoils ending up in their
ethnic homeland.
5.6 The role of ethnic parties
Given that the motives for ethnic favoritism include electoral concerns and possibly also
ethnicity-based altruism, we conjecture that the presence of ethnic parties facilitates eth-
nic favoritism or even increases the voters’ demand for it. In this section we shed light on
how the presence of ethnic parties affect ethnic favoritism.
We use three different measures on the prevalence of ethnic parties. The first is the
cumulative vote shares of ethnic parties in the first election after 1991 (EthnicSharec).
We interact this measure with our main explanatory variable (Leaderict) in columns (1)
and (5) of Table 8.
Table 8 about here
The coefficient estimate on this interaction term is positive and statistically significant at
the 10% level in the Ethnologue data, but not the GREG data. This estimate provides
some evidence that ethnic parties could facilitate ethnic favoritism.
In columns (2) and (5) we use the party voting fractionalization index (EthnicPV Fc).
The coefficient estimates on the respective interaction term are positive, but not statis-
35In the Online Appendix, we combine these two approaches and study whether the effects of elections
on the extent of ethnic favoritism differs between elections in which the political leader has reached his
term limit and elections in which he could run for reelection. We find no evidence for such a difference.
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tically significant, providing some indication that the presence of many parties with an
ethnically homogeneous pool of voters tends to be associated with higher ethnic favoritism.
In columns (3) and (7) we use the share of Afrobarometer respondents who consider
the ethnicity of the party leaders or members to be the main difference between the ruling
party and the opposition parties (EthnicParticipationc). This share directly measures
whether the main parties are perceived as ethnic parties by the people. We find a strong
positive effect of this perception on ethnic favoritism in both data sets. This result strongly
suggests that the presence of ethnic parties is conducive to ethnic favoritism, at least in
Africa.
As each of these three measures of ethnic parties is only available for a subset of
the countries in our samples, we also use an alternative proxy for the importance of
ethnic parties that is available for most countries. In particular, we look at whether
ethnic favoritism is less prevalent in countries where no single ethnic group constitutes
a majority compared to countries where an ethnic majority group exists. The idea is
that ethnic parties should play a less important role if an ethnic majority group exists:
First, political leaders from a minority group would typically be ill-advised to make ethnic
cleavages salient before an upcoming election in these countries. Second, political leaders
from the majority group often run against candidates from the same group, such that
focusing on ethnic cleavages might not typically improve (re)election chances. We set
NoMajorityc to one if there exists no ethnic group to which more than 50% of the
population belong, and to zero otherwise. To ensure consistency with our ethnographic
maps, we use data on the size of ethnic groups from Ethnologue and the classical Soviet
Atlas Narodov Mira, respectively.36 The coefficient estimates reported in columns (4) and
(8) indeed suggest that ethnic favoritism tends to be more prevalent in countries with no
ethnic majority group, but these estimates are not statistically significant.
The pattern emerging from the use of our various measures on the prevalence of ethnic
parties is consistent with the notion that ethnic parties facilitate ethnic favoritism.
5.7 Exploiting linguistic distances
We finally exploit the fact that Ethnologue provides a linguistic tree indicating the relation
between all ethnolinguistic groups.37 We construct the linguistic distance between any
two ethnic groups following the approach by Putterman and Weil (2010) and focus on
the linguistic distance of any ethnic group from the ethnic group of the country’s current
36The Ethnologue data on the size of ethnic groups refer to recent years. The GREG/Atlas Narodov
Mira population estimates refer to 1959–1961, such that NoMajorityc is unavailable for countries that
have partitioned since the 1960s.
37We thank Stelios Michalopoulos for suggesting this extension at the NBER 2015 Political Economy
Workshop.
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political leader.38 In our sample, the average linguistic distance from the political leader’s
ethnicity is 0.59 (with a standard deviation of 0.39). We construct dummy variables
representing various ranges of this distance: DistanceXict = 1 if the linguistic distance is
between (X − 1)/10 and X/10 for X = {0, 1, 2, ..., 5}.
We use these dummy variables as explanatory variables in column (1) of Table 9.
Table 9 about here
These estimates are interesting for various reasons. First, they show that the extent to
which political leaders support their ethnic homelands is larger than the main specifica-
tion implies. In particular, the coefficient estimate on Distance0ict of 0.100 implies that
the ethnic homelands of the political leaders have 10.5% more intense nighttime light
and 3.2% more economic activity than they would have in a counterfactual situation of
a political leader with a linguistic distance larger than 0.5. Second, the estimates show
that ethnic favoritism extends to linguistically close groups. In particular, the coeffi-
cient estimates on Distance1ict and Distance2ict are still relatively large. This pattern
strengthens our claim that omitted-variable concerns are not driving our estimates. The
major endogeneity concern is that new political leaders may come from ethnographic
regions that have become more economically active in recent years. We have shown in
section 5.2 that the nighttime light dynamics around ethnic transitions do not support
this scenario. Complementarily, the finding that linguistically close groups benefit also
does not support this scenario, as it seems even less likely that political leaders get into
power because linguistically close groups have become economically more active.
We next separate the effects in years around elections and in other years. More specif-
ically, we replace all the distance variables with the interaction terms of these variables
with Election3ct, which is equal to one if there is a leadership election in the previous,
the current or the next year, as well as with (1 − Election3ct). We report the coeffi-
cient estimates on these interaction terms in columns (2a) and (2b), respectively. We
find that ethnic favoritism towards the ethnic homelands of linguistically relatively close
groups also increases during the election season, providing further evidence that electoral
concerns are an important motive for ethnic favoritism.
6 Conclusions
Motivated by the questions whether, where, and when ethnic favoritism is an axiom of
politics, we have presented a novel approach to study the prevalence and determinants
38In a linguistic tree, each language is characterized by a series of nodes. Putterman and Weil (2010,
Appendix C) define the linguistic distance between any pair of languages i, j as 1−
√
2mci,j/(mi +mj),
where mi is the number of nodes of language i, and m
c
i,j the number of common nodes of languages i
and j.
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of ethnic favoritism. Unlike the previous literature, we have studied ethnic favoritism at
the global level using two panel data sets with several thousand subnational ethnographic
regions from around 140 multi-ethnic countries. Moreover, we have taken seriously Kra-
mon and Posner’s (2013) warning against generalizations based on findings for a single
policy area and used an output measure – nighttime light intensity – that captures the
aggregate distributional effect of a wide range of policies. We find strong evidence for
ethnic favoritism: ethnographic regions enjoy on average 7%–10% higher nighttime light
intensity and 2%–3% higher GDP when being the political leader’s ethnic homeland.
Thanks to our large and diverse sample, we have gained interesting new insights into
the prevalence and determinants of ethnic favoritism. First, even though ethnic favoritism
is prevalent in Africa, it is not just an African axiom of politics. It is a global axiom
of politics, which is prevalent within and outside of Africa and in poor as well as rich
countries. Second, the constraining effects of sound political institutions are limited.
Hence, democratization is in general no panacea for curbing ethnic favoritism. Third,
electoral concerns and ethnic parties contribute to ethnic favoritism, which may explain
why democratization is no panacea. Finally, the regional economic benefits of ethnic
favoritism are just temporary. Hence, ethnic favoritism does not contribute to sustainable
development.
At first glance, these findings draw a rather pessimistic picture. However, future re-
search exploring different mechanisms by which political institutions may impact on ethnic
favoritism could lead to more insights and point towards possible policy interventions that
may help to curb ethnic favoritism. We are confident that our novel approach relying on
satellite data of nighttime light intensity and ethnographic regions from many countries
from all over the world can be usefully employed to tackle these and other questions.39
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
(overall, between, within)
A. Ethnologue
Lightict 147,825 -2.50 2.48, 2.37, 0.66 -4.61 4.14
Leaderict 147,825 0.05 0.17, 0.16, 0.06 0 1
GDPct 120,541 7.98 1.24, 1.20, 0.30 5.29 11.16
Polityct 141,164 0.65 0.30, 0.25, 0.15 0 1
TermLimitedct 124,395 0.13 0.34, 0.30, 0.12 0 1
Electionct 135,050 0.16 0.36, 0.08, 0.36 0 1
EthnicSharec 94,286 0.18 0.26, 0.26, 0.00 0 1
EthnicPV Fc 57,224 0.17 0.13, 0.13, 0.00 0 0.46
EthnicPerceptionc 35,944 0.04 0.03, 0.03. 0.00 0.00 0.13
B. GREG
Lightict 41,416 -1.50 2.37, 2.30, 0.59 -4.61 4.08
Leaderict 41,416 0.14 0.29, 0.27, 0.09 0 1
GDPct 35,700 8.27 1.15, 1.13, 0.27 5.29 10.88
Polityct 39,546 0.63 0.32, 0.29, 0.13 0 1
TermLimitedct 35,109 0.13 0.33, 0.30, 0.11 0 1
Electionct 37,487 0.17 0.38, 0.08, 0.37 0 1
EthnicSharec 23,822 0.17 0.27, 0.27, 0.00 0 1
EthnicPV Fc 15,023 0.13 0.12, 0.12, 0.00 0 0.46
EthnicPerceptionc 7,701 0.04 0.03, 0.03, 0.00 0.00 0.13
Notes: Summary statistics based on annual data for ethnographic regions from 1992-2013, based on
the Ethnologue and the GREG sample used in our main specification (Table 3, column (3)).
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Table 2: Information on countries with ethnic transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Countries Leadership Ethnic GDPct Polityct Ethnographic
transitions transitions regions
A. Ethnologue
Entire sample 141 4.05 (3.0) 1.09 (0.0) 8.44 (8.31) 0.67 (0.75) 54.28 (13.0)
Countries with ethnic transitions 52 4.17 (3.0) 2.96 (2.0) 7.83 (7.46) 0.66 (0.70) 85.37 (31.5)
in Africa 28 3.39 (3.0) 2.79 (2.0) 7.00 (6.98) 0.56 (0.60) 59.79 (35.5)
elsewhere 24 5.08 (4.0) 3.17 (2.0) 8.51 (8.58) 0.78 (0.86) 115.21 (12.5)
B. GREG
Entire sample 137 4.22 (3.0) 0.99 (0.0) 8.40 (8.31) 0.66 (0.74) 14.83 (9.0)
Countries with ethnic transitions 45 4.51 (3.0) 3.02 (2.0) 7.82 (7.60) 0.64 (0.64) 18.42 (13.0)
in Africa 25 3.20 (3.0) 2.44 (2.0) 7.05 (7.05) 0.54 (0.55) 13.56 (12.0)
elsewhere 20 6.15 (4.0) 3.75 (2.5) 8.81 (8.58) 0.77 (0.85) 24.50 (15.5)
Notes: Table is based on our data on political leaders for 1992–2013. Column (1) indicates the number of countries in the respective
sample. Column (2) indicates the average (median) number of leadership transitions in the respective sample. Column (3) indicates
the average (median) number of leadership transitions associated with a change in the political leader’s ethnicity in the respective
sample. Column (4) and (5) indicate the average (median) values of GDPct and Polityct in the respective sample (see main text for
the definitions of GDPct and Polityct). Column (6) indicates the average (median) number of ethnographic regions in the countries
of the respective sample according to the respective ethnographic map.
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Table 3: Ethnic favoritism: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Ethnologue
Leaderict 1.319*** 0.921* 0.068*** 0.070** 0.070*** 0.061***
(0.278) (0.500) (0.022) (0.030) (0.023) (0.021)
Leaderict−τ 0.072*** 0.088***
(0.022) (0.022)
Lightict−1 0.948***
(0.005)
Region fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes yes no
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.468 0.382 0.265 0.265 0.267 0.267 0.202 0.941
Observations 147,825 77,603 147,825 115,279 147,617 147,208 147,825 141,394
Number of countries 141 52 141 141 141 141 141 141
B. GREG
Leaderict 1.648*** 1.605*** 0.074** 0.047 0.067** 0.051***
(0.158) (0.331) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.007)
Leaderict−τ 0.082*** 0.096***
(0.028) (0.029)
Lightict−1 0.967***
(0.003)
Region fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes yes no
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.524 0.439 0.490 0.497 0.492 0.492 0.421 0.968
Observations 41,416 15,290 41,416 30,884 41,284 40,961 41,416 39,544
Number of countries 137 43 137 137 137 137 137 137
Dependent variable Lightict Lightict Lightict Lightict Lightict Lightict Lightpcict Lightict
Lagged explanatory variable no no no no τ = 1 τ = 2 no no
Sample restriction no Ethnic no Homogenous no no no no
transitions regions
Notes: Columns (3)-(7) report fixed effect estimates, and columns (1), (2) and (8) standard OLS estimates using annual data for
ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic countries (according to the respective ethnographic map) from 1992–2013, excluding country-
years with ethnic transitions. Dependent variable is Lightict, except in column (7) where it is Lightpcict. Column (2) excludes
countries without ethnic transitions, and column (4) ethnographic regions with more than one ethnic group. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 4: Transitional dynamics
Ethnologue GREG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PreEntry2ict -0.040 0.010
(0.081) (0.030)
PreEntry1ict -0.046 -0.019 0.001 0.006
(0.062) (0.048) (0.029) (0.034)
Entryict 0.024 0.025 0.035 0.014 0.024 0.027
(0.026) (0.031) (0.038) (0.029) (0.034) (0.038)
Leaderict 0.059** 0.061** 0.062* 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.094***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.032)
Exitict 0.029 0.032 0.037 0.060* 0.070* 0.094**
(0.027) (0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.040) (0.043)
PostExit1ict -0.007 -0.019 0.033 0.017
(0.047) (0.053) (0.038) (0.044)
PostExit2ict -0.042 0.019
(0.043) (0.028)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.259 0.259 0.257 0.490 0.490 0.481
Observations 162,083 161,916 152,370 43,670 43,651 41,299
Number of countries 141 141 141 137 137 137
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic
countries (according to the respective ethnographic map) from 1992–2013. Dependent variable is Lightict.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1,
5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 5: Ethnic favoritism is not birthplace favoritism
Ethnologue GREG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Leaderict 0.074** 0.064** 0.078 0.086*** 0.081** 0.092***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.052) (0.029) (0.033) (0.027)
LeaderBirthict 0.042* 0.027 0.036 0.011
(0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.259 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.478
Observations 137,161 137,161 137,161 134,642 39,189 39,189 39,189 38,971
Number of countries 139 139 139 139 136 136 136 136
SN2 birth regions clipped no no no yes no no no yes
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic countries (according to the
respective ethnographic map) from 1992–2013, excluding country-years with ethnic transitions or with political leaders whose
birth place were abroad or are unknown. Dependent variable is Lightict, but in columns (4) and (8) the SN2 birth regions of
all political leaders during our sample period are dropped from the respective ethnographic regions before calculating average
regional nighttime light intensity (see text for details). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **,
* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 6: Ethnic favoritism across the world
Ethnologue GREG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Leaderict 0.060*** 0.363 0.096 0.453 0.079* 0.199 0.138* 0.182
(0.018) (0.263) (0.082) (0.381) (0.043) (0.269) (0.078) (0.445)
Leaderict ×Africac 0.020 -0.053 -0.010 -0.027
(0.047) (0.078) (0.058) (0.105)
Leaderict ×GDPct -0.038 -0.045 -0.016 -0.000
(0.034) (0.048) (0.035) (0.052)
Leaderict × Polityct -0.050 -0.033 -0.103 -0.128
(0.101) (0.113) (0.104) (0.110)
Leaderict ×Democracyct 0.051** 0.029
(0.024) (0.036)
Leaderict ×Anocracyct 0.088 0.127**
(0.058) (0.061)
Leaderict ×Autocracyct 0.043 0.116
(0.080) (0.075)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.265 0.262 0.264 0.261 0.264 0.490 0.470 0.491 0.469 0.491
Observations 147,825 120,541 141,164 115,137 141,164 41,416 35,700 39,546 34,442 39,546
Number of countries 141 131 134 125 134 137 127 131 122 131
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic countries (according to the respective
ethnographic map) from 1992–2013, excluding country-years with ethnic transitions. Dependent variable is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted
for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 7: Elections, term limits and ethnic favoritism
Ethnologue GREG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Leaderict 0.052** -0.036 0.065*** 0.064** 0.067** 0.046 0.070** 0.034
(0.025) (0.069) (0.025) (0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036)
Leaderict × Electionct+1 0.020 0.017 0.031* 0.029*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Leaderict × Electionct 0.031* 0.028* 0.016 0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022)
Leaderict × Electionct−1 0.045** 0.047** 0.016 0.024
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Leaderict × Electionsc 0.081 -0.023
(0.073) (0.045)
Leaderict × TermLimitedct 0.059 0.127 0.021 0.069
(0.120) (0.161) (0.054) (0.054)
Leaderict × TermLimitsc -0.155 -0.078
(0.120) (0.082)
Leaderict × Experiencect 0.003 0.003 0.008* 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.239 0.239 0.268 0.268 0.453 0.453 0.481 0.481
Observations 127,913 127,913 124,395 124,395 35,621 35,621 35,109 35,109
Number of countries 136 136 131 131 133 133 130 130
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic countries (according
to the respective ethnographic map) from 1992–2013, excluding country-years with ethnic transitions. Dependent variable
is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and
10%-level, respectively.
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Table 8: Ethnic parties and ethnic favoritism
Ethnologue GREG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Leaderict 0.018 -0.028 -0.060 0.015 0.087 0.048 -0.065 0.055
(0.033) (0.044) (0.061) (0.036) (0.058) (0.070) (0.044) (0.065)
Leaderict × EthnicSharect 0.169* -0.030
(0.090) (0.114)
Leaderict × EthnicPV Fct 0.195 0.126
(0.144) (0.357)
Leaderict × EthnicPerceptionct 2.339** 2.240***
(1.078) (0.451)
Leaderict ×NoMajorityct 0.069 0.043
(0.044) (0.072)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.238 0.230 0.185 0.265 0.476 0.411 0.422 0.498
Observations 94,286 57,224 35,944 147,825 23,822 15,023 7,701 36,566
Number of countries 96 41 29 141 94 39 28 114
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic countries (according
to the respective ethnographic map) from 1992–2013, excluding country-years with ethnic transitions. Dependent variable
is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and
10%-level, respectively.
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Table 9: Ethnic favoritism and linguistic distances
Ethnologue
(1) (2a) (2b)
Interacted with: – Election3ct (1− Election3ct)
Distance0ict 0.100*** 0.117*** 0.090**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.039)
Distance1ict 0.078* 0.086** 0.063
(0.040) (0.038) (0.041)
Distance2ict 0.063* 0.090*** 0.049
(0.030) (0.032) (0.037)
Distance3ict 0.034 0.066 0.043
(0.044) (0.042) (0.046)
Distance4ict 0.039 0.065 0.013
(0.040) (0.040) (0.048)
Distance5ict 0.015 0.009 -0.013
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
Region fixed effects yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes
R-squared 0.265 0.239
Observations 147,825 127,913
Number of countries 141 136
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic re-
gions of multi-ethnic countries (according to Ethnologue) from 1992–2013, excluding
country-years with ethnic transitions. Dependent variable is Lightict. Columns (2a)
and (2b) report coefficient estimates on different interaction terms from the same
regression. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **,
* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1: Time windows around ethnic transitions
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B. GREG
Notes: Figures are based on 11-year time windows around ethnic transitions in which the new political
leader is from an ethnic group that was out of power in the previous five years and stayed in power in
the subsequent five years. The coefficient estimates indicate his ethnic homeland in the years prior to
the ethnic transition (-4,-3,-2,-1, with -5 being omitted), the year of the ethnic transition (0), and the
years thereafter (+1,+2,+3,+4,+5). The estimates include region-fixed effects and country-year dummy
variables. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. Vertical lines indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
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Online Appendix
A.1 Demography, geography and ethnic favoritism
This appendix shows whether and how the extent of ethnic favoritism depends on de-
mographic and geographic characteristics of the political leaders’ ethnic homelands. The
motivation is that certain geographic characteristics may impact the willingness or the
ability of political leaders to target policies towards their ethnic homeland. We therefore
want to compare the extent of ethnic favoritism in flat, fertile, densely populated versus
rugged, infertile, thinly populated ethnic homelands as well as ethnic favoritism in home-
lands close versus far from the capital or the coast. For that purpose, we build a number
of interaction terms between our main explanatory variable (Leaderict) and the following
ethnic homeland-specific demographic and geographic characteristics:
• Population Density: The log of the number of people per km2. Population data
stems from the Gridded Population of the World, version 3 (CIESIN 2016).
• Capital: A dummy variable that indicates whether the capital of country c is located
in ethnic homeland i. Information about the coordinates of a country’s capital is
taken from Weidmann et al. (2010).
• Distance to Capital: The log of the distance between the ethnic homeland’s geo-
graphic center and the country’s capital in km. The ethnic homeland’s centroid
were calculated by the authors. Information about the coordinates of a country’s
capital is taken from Weidmann et al. (2010).
• Distance to the Coast: The log of the distance between the ethnic homeland’s
geographic center and the nearest coast line in km. The ethnic homeland’s centroid
were calculated by the authors. Vector data on the world’s shorelines stems from
Wessel and Smith (1996).
• Elevation: We used data from GTOPO30, which is a global digital elevation model
(DEM) with a horizontal grid spacing of 30 arc seconds (approximately 1 kilometer),
to calculate each ethnic homeland’s average elevation in 1000m. These data are
distributed by the Land Processes Distributed Active Archive Center (LP DAAC),
located at USGS/EROS.
• Ruggedness: We used data from GTOPO30 to calculate the Mean Terrain Rough-
ness Index. This index reflects the average absolute height difference between a
raster pixel and its neighbors and is normalized to 0-1. The raw data are obtained
by the Land Processes Distributed Active Archive Center (LP DAAC), located at
USGS/EROS.
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• Agricultural Suitability: Average land suitability for agriculture within each ethnic
homeland. The index calculates land suitability for cultivation based on climate
and soil constraints. The original raster data does not provide complete coverage of
the globe’s land area (for example, it does not cover some peninsulas and islands).
This variable is therefore missing for some observations. The raw raster data comes
from Ramankutty et al. (2002).
Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics of these demographic and geographic vari-
ables for the Ethnologue and the GREG data set. Tables A2 and A3 present the coef-
ficient estimates on the interaction terms between Leaderict and these demographic and
geographic variables for both data sets. Most demographic and geographic characteristics
do not seem to have an effect on the extent of ethnic favoritism, except that there tends
to be more ethnic favoritism if the political leader’s ethnic homeland has high altitude
and non-rugged terrain.
A.2 Historical political centralization and ethnic favoritism
This appendix shows whether and how the extent of ethnic favoritism depends on an ethnic
group’s historical political centralization. Murdock (1969) provides a commonly used
measure of pre-colonial/historical political centralization. Among others, Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2013) use it to look at differences across ethnic homelands in Africa.
Unfortunately, ethnographic maps featuring the same ethnicities as the Murdock data
on historical political centralization are only available for Africa, while we are interested
in the role of historical political centralization at a global level. We therefore match
the ethnic groups in Murdock to those in Ethnologue as well as to those in GREG. We
thereby restrict ourselves to countries with ethnic transitions, i.e., countries that had
political leaders from more than one ethnic groups during the sample period.40 Once
the ethnic groups in Murdock (1969) are matched to those in our two data sets, we can
assign Murdock’s categories for historical political centralization to the political leaders’
ethnic groups in our two data sets. These categories are (in increasing order of political
centralization): stateless societies without any centralized political organization, petty
chiefdoms, large chiefdoms, small states, and large states. Following Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2013), we define an ordered variable, ranging from 0 (stateless societies)
to 4 (large states) as well as a dummy variable that is equal to one for large chiefdoms
and states, and zero otherwise. We call these variables Centralization(ordered)ct and
Centralization(dummy)ct, respectively.
Table A4 presents our estimates. Odd columns make use of all country-years for
which we have the historical political centralization of the political leader’s ethnic group,
40These countries identify the effect of interaction terms between Leaderict and measures of historical
political centralization, as such interaction terms are time-invariant in countries without ethnic transi-
tions.
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while even columns restrict the sample to those countries for which we have the historical
political centralization of all political leaders throughout the sample period. The results –
especially those based on the Ethnologue data – suggest that political leaders from ethnic
groups with higher historical political centralization engage less in ethnic favoritism. This
finding is in line with the notion that better historical institutions may map into a less
tribal conception of politics.
A.3 Elections with term-limited leaders and ethnic favoritism
Section 5.5 shows how leadership elections and term limits affect the extent of ethnic
favoritism. In this appendix, we go one step further and look at term limits and election
years jointly. We rely again on the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy
(NELDA) database. We code the dummy variable ElectionTLct to be equal to one for
the country-years in which a leadership election took place and the incumbent political
leader could not run for reelection due to binding term limits, and zero otherwise. We
further code the time-invariant dummy variable ElectionsTLc to be equal to one for all
countries in which there was at least one leadership election with a term-limited political
leader during our sample period.
In Table A5 we present the same specifications as in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6)
of Table 7, but with interaction terms between Leaderict, on the one hand, and lag,
contemporaneous, and lead values of ElectionTLct as well as ElectionsTLc, on the other
hand. The coefficient estimates on all these newly added interaction terms are statically
insignificant. Hence, we find no evidence that the extent of ethnic favoritism in election
years differs depending on whether or not the incumbent political leader is term-limited.
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Table A1: Summary statistics for demographic and geographic variables
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
A. Ethnologue
PopDensityict 147,825 3.30 1.68 0.00 10.37
Capitalic 147,825 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
DistCapitalic 147,825 6.35 1.08 0.59 8.95
DistCoastic 147,825 11.88 1.84 2.28 14.77
Elevationic 147,803 0.68 0.76 -1.15 5.69
Ruggednessic 147,803 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.99
AgriSuitabilityic 139,144 0.41 0.27 0.00 1.00
B. GREG
PopDensityict 41,416 3.34 1.61 0.00 8.72
Capitalct 41,416 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.00
DistCapitalic 41,416 6.29 1.10 1.38 8.96
DistCoastic 41,416 12.21 1.67 3.44 14.76
Elevationic 41,416 0.68 0.74 -0.07 4.86
Ruggednessic 41,416 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.91
AgriSuitabilityic 39,964 0.39 0.26 0.00 0.99
Notes: Summary statistics based on annual data for ethnographic regions
from 1992–2013, based on the Ethnologue and the GREG sample used in
Tables A2 and A3.
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Table A2: Demography, geography and ethnic favoritism (Ethnologue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Leaderict 0.241 0.066*** 0.198 0.236 0.045 0.102*** 0.141**
(0.153) (0.024) (0.146) (0.224) (0.039) (0.028) (0.057)
Leaderict × PopDensityict -0.041
(0.036)
Leaderict × Capitalic 0.016
(0.063)
Leaderict ×DistCapitalic -0.023
(0.025)
Leaderict ×DistCoastic -0.014
(0.018)
Leaderict × Elevationic 0.029
(0.032)
Leaderict ×Ruggednessic -0.336**
(0.143)
Leaderict ×AgriSuitabilityic -0.179
(0.128)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.275
Observations 147,825 147,825 147,825 147,825 147,803 147,803 139,144
Countries 137 137 137 137 137 137 137
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic countries
(according to the Ethnologue) from 1992–2013, excluding country-years with ethnic transitions. Dependent
variable is Lightict. Column (1) includes PopDensityict as control variable (coefficient not reported). Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level,
respectively.
45
Table A3: Demography, geography and ethnic favoritism (GREG)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Leaderict 0.093 0.088** 0.065 -0.034 0.027 0.108*** 0.151**
(0.084) (0.035) (0.166) (0.253) (0.038) (0.036) (0.068)
Leaderict × PopDensityict -0.005
(0.020)
Leaderict × Capitalic -0.114
(0.089)
Leaderict ×DistCapitalic 0.002
(0.029)
Leaderict ×DistCoastic 0.009
(0.021)
Leaderict × Elevationic 0.083**
(0.036)
Leaderict ×Ruggednessic -0.462
(0.300)
Leaderict ×AgriSuitabilityic -0.202
(0.138)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.495
Observations 41,416 41,416 41,416 41,416 41,416 41,416 39,964
Countries 137 137 137 137 137 137 134
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic countries
(according to GREG) from 1992–2013, excluding country-years with ethnic transitions. Dependent variable is
Lightict. Column (1) includes PopDensityict as control variable (coefficient not reported). Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table A4: Historical political centralization and ethnic favoritism
Ethnologue GREG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Leaderict 0.291*** 0.322*** 0.215*** 0.241*** 0.210*** 0.245*** 0.188*** 0.212***
(0.094) (0.109) (0.074) (0.080) (0.071) (0.069) (0.042) (0.040)
Leaderict × Centralization(ordered)ct -0.085*** -0.094*** -0.044 -0.053*
(0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030)
Leaderict × Centralization(dummy)ct -0.192** -0.223** -0.112* -0.125*
(0.076) (0.084) (0.063) (0.068)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.211 0.201 0.211 0.200
Observations 63,001 53,150 63,001 53,150 13,554 10,943 13,554 10,943
Countries 40 23 40 23 40 28 40 28
Countries with missing obs. included excluded included excluded included excluded included excluded
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic regions of multi-ethnic countries (according to respective ethno-
graphic map) from 1992–2013, excluding country-years with ethnic transitions. Dependent variable is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted for
clustering at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table A5: Elections with term-limited political leaders and ethnic favoritism
Ethnologue GREG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leaderict 0.052** -0.033 0.066** 0.047
(0.024) (0.066) (0.033) (0.029)
Leaderict × Electionct+1 0.031 0.029 0.041** 0.043**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Leaderict × Electionct 0.026 0.023 0.017 0.017
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
Leaderict × Electionct−1 0.043** 0.045** 0.014 0.022
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Leaderict × ElectionTLct+1 -0.061 -0.060 -0.040 -0.048
(0.062) (0.063) (0.040) (0.043)
Leaderict × ElectionTLct 0.039 0.037 -0.001 -0.009
(0.035) (0.036) (0.044) (0.046)
Leaderict × ElectionTLct−1 0.010 0.016 0.003 0.015
(0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.043)
Leaderict × Electionsc 0.083 0.008
(0.071) (0.045)
Leaderict × ElectionsTLc -0.043 -0.129*
(0.057) (0.076)
Leaderict × Experiencect 0.003 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Country-year dummy variables yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.239 0.239 0.453 0.453
Observations 127,913 127,913 35,621 35,621
Number of countries 136 136 133 133
Notes: Table reports fixed effect estimates using annual data for ethnographic
regions of multi-ethnic countries (according to the respective ethnographic map)
from 1992–2013, excluding country-years with ethnic transitions. Dependent vari-
able is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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